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The Treasury's Tax Reform Proposals:
Not A "Fair" Tax
Stuart Rosow*
The present income tax is badly in need offundamental simplification and reform.
It is too complicated, it is unfair and it interferes with economic choices and
retards saving, investment and growth. I
The Treasury Department's view of the current income tax sys-
tem, as reflected in its 1984 Report to the President on tax reform,
is reminiscent of Thomas Hobbes' view of life in the state of nature.
To Hobbes, such a life was "nasty, brutish and short," 2 and accord-
ingly in desperate need of change. To alter this state of affairs,
Hobbes created the Leviathan, an all powerful creature capable of
imposing order on the existing political chaos.
The Treasury has only slightly less ambitious hopes for its pro-
posed reform of the tax code. According to the Treasury, the pres-
ent income tax system is deeply unfair. Two households with equal
incomes pay different amounts of tax depending on how they re-
ceive or spend income, 3 and families can be taxed even though their
income is below the poverty level. 4 The current income tax is also
extremely complex. According to the Treasury, many Americans
have become part-time bookkeepers, required to keep extensive
records in order to compute their tax liability. 5 The greatest flaw of
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3. 1 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 5. Examples of tax preferred income include
life insurance (I.R.C. § 101), scholarships (I.R.C. § 117) and employer provided child care
(I.R.C. § 129). Examples of tax-preferred expenditures include deductions for medical
expenses (I.R.C. § 213), charitable contributions (I.R.C. § 170) and interest on home
mortgages (I.R.C. § 163).
4. 1 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 14.
5. 1 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 3. "A simple tax system would not require
41 percent of all taxpayers-and about the 60 percent of those who itemize deduc-
tions-to engage professional assistance in preparing their tax returns." Id. at 16. Com-
plexity arises because of the large number of special provisions that depart from basic
income tax principles. These include many of the items the Treasury seeks to repeal,
such as the deduction for two earner married couples (I.R.C. § 221), the treatment of
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the current income tax, contends the Treasury, is its economic inef-
ficiency. The income tax is replete with preferences that distort
business and investment decisions. In addition, the system fails to
account adequately for the effects of inflation.
6
The Treasury has proposed a modified flat rate tax to right what is
wrong with our tax system. The Treasury thinks a modified flat tax
imposed upon a broad base will rationalize a tax system that has
developed without a consistent theory, induce a public bent upon
tax avoidance to embrace compliance and, perhaps most impor-
tantly, stimulate economic growth. The Treasury's view is that a
lower tax rate coupled with a broadened base and larger personal
exemptions will yield a fairer, more balanced system. Reducing
rates, eliminating preferences and other modifications, such as the
partial integration of the corporate income tax, will, it is hoped, lead
to a more efficient, growth-oriented tax. Finally, these changes, to-
gether with the elimination of a host of deductions and credits,
ranging from the state and local tax deduction 7 to the residential
energy credit,8 will simplify the system sufficiently to cause a return
to the halycon compliance of years past.9
Few would dispute the claim that the present income tax system is
seriously flawed. 10 Admittedly, the Internal Revenue Code con-
tains serious impediments to a fair, efficient and easily administered
tax."I However, in evaluating the Treasury's proposals it is not suffi-
cient to end the inquiry by noting the existing problems in the
Code. The issue is whether these flaws are sufficient cause to re-
voluntary employee beneficiary associations (I.R.C. §§ 401-420), and the deduction for
state and local taxes (I.R.C. § 164).
6. 1 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 6. The Accelerated Cost Recovery System
was enacted in 1981 partially to account for the disparity between historic and replace-
ment costs of depreciable assets. I.R.C. §§ 167-168. The rules governing the tax treat-
ment of debt instruments using original issue discount rather than stated interest have
recently been expanded. The rules now apply whenever debt is issued for property
rather than only when the debt was publicly traded or issued by a corporation. I.R.C.
§§ 1271-1275. The failure to require the accrual of interest on all such obligations had
allowed taxpayers to treat interest payments as part of the purchase price of the prop-
erty. Thus, they could obtain a larger basis for depreciation deductions or could treat a
larger portion of their proceeds from the sale of the property as capital gain.
7. I.R.C. § 164.
8. I.R.C. § 44(c).
9. All compliance estimates are, of course, speculative. According to the Treasury,
however, unreported income for 1981 was $90.5 billion. 1 TREASURY REPORT, supra note
1, at 89.
10. See, e.g., OPTIONS FOR TAX REFORM, (J. Pechman ed. 1984) (Brookings
Institution).
11. See Graetz & McDowell, Tax Reform 1985: The Quest for a Fairer, More Efficient and
Simpler Income Tax, 3 YALE LAW & POL'Y REV. 5, (1984).
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place our progressive income tax with the proposed modified flat
tax.
This discussion will approach this question by first identifying
those characteristics of an "ideal" tax system that can be considered
universal or around which a consensus has emerged. These charac-
teristics-described in Part I-constitute the shared premises of an
ideal tax system. The extent to which the Treasury's proposals re-
flect the most important of these premises-fairness-will be ex-
plored in Part II. That discussion will suggest that the Treasury's
claim that its proposals will not result in an overall redistribution of
tax burdens is specious. In fact, in practical economic terms, the
Treasury's proposals would have a generally regressive effect, favor-
ing the wealthy at the expense of the poor.
There are, of course, some limitations to this approach. One
might question whether it is at all meaningful to speak of an ideal
tax system. Perceptions of what is desirable in a tax system are often
colored by the observer's self-interest, and value judgments are not
necessarily made on the basis of detached, objective analyses.
Moreover, even if a system of shared premises could be imagined, it
remains questionable whether it could emerge unscathed from the
political process.12 Despite these practical limitations, no useful cri-
tique of the Treasury's approach to tax reform can be offered with-
out reference to the norms suggested by these shared premises.
I. The Normative Framework
The shared premises of an ideal tax system can generally be de-
scribed as fairness, efficiency and simplicity. These normative as-
sumptions are not objectively measurable; rather they reflect
particular subjective values. The means by which these values are
realized are certain to reflect individual political outlooks. Those
who believe the government's role in the economy should be re-
stricted will view these goals differently from those who believe the
government has an obligation to mitigate the adverse impact of the
free market system. For instance, to those who believe in the dis-
tributive justice of the free market economy, fairness may mean not
depriving the successful of their earnings; to those who emphasize
the redistributive obligations of government, fairness may mean im-
posing greater taxes on those of greater means.' 3 In brief, the
12. See, e.g., Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L. J. 259, 274-77
(1984).
13. See generally STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITrEE ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
Vol. 3:58, 1984
Not A "Fair" Tax
choice of a system of taxation reflects subjective political orientation
more than objective economic truth.
A. Fairness
All agree that a fair and equitable tax system is desirable. There is
less agreement about the contours of such a system. Various tests of
fairness exist; two will be discussed here. Horizontal equity meas-
ures deviations from the equal treatment of equally situated taxpay-
ers. Vertical equity, on the other hand, focuses on how relevent
differences among taxpayers are accounted for.14 Each concept car-
ries with it a unique set of difficulties; both are susceptible to ambig-
uous interpretation; neither is purely objective.
For a system to be fair it must, at a minimum, achieve horizontal
equity. 15 In an income tax system, horizontal equity mandates that
taxpayers with the same income pay the same amount of taxes.
Identical income implies an identical ability to pay. Since both com-
ponents can be quantified, horizontal equity is a purportedly objec-
tive measure of fairness.
The goal of equal treatment for those in equal economic positions
is an admirable one. Even if this principle were universally accepted,
however, serious problems remain in giving content to its terms. Is
income rather than wealth or consumption the proper measuring
rod? 16 Is an annual measurement, substantially divorced from the
events of prior years, the proper approach?' 7 Similar questions
abound. Thus, as a threshold matter, we must acknowledge that
horizontal equity is not capable of precise computation.
Another measurement of fairness is vertical equity. This requires
that taxpayers with different levels of income pay differing propor-
tions of their income in tax. But whether vertical equity has been
achieved is not subject to objective verification either. Rather, the
ANALYSIS OF PROPOSALS RELATING TO BROADENING THE BASE AND LOWERING THE RATES
OF THE INCOME TAX, (Comm. Print 1982).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See 1 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 255 (comparing the Treasury's Proposal
with the tax systems of several other countries). See also Andrews, A Consumption-Type or
Cash-Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974).
17. The Code contains provisions designed to mitigate the effects of an annual ac-
counting period. The present carryover rules for net operating losses, however, are
limited to trade or business losses and restricted to a specified number of years. (I.R.C.
§ 172). For individuals, income averaging offers some ability to account for widely dif-
fering income in different years. However, the income averaging rules apply only when
income in the current year substantially exceeds the average of the prior years. (I.R.C.
§ 1302).
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degree to which a system should be progressive or regressive impli-
cates fundamental value judgments. Advocates of a progressive tax
system argue that the costs of government should be imposed in
proportion to the ability of taxpayers to bear them.' Central to this
normative concept is a belief that government should facilitate
wealth redistribution. Opponents of progressivity argue that it is un-
fair to penalize those who are successful in a free market economy,
and implicitly reject the idea that the government should help the
unsuccessful through the tax system.' 9 Complete lack of progressiv-
ity would result in a pure flat rate tax. 20 This kind of tax does not
appear to command majority support. Despite the rising political
influence of opponents of progressivity, a national consensus clearly
exists in favor of imposing a greater tax burden on those with a
greater ability to bear that burden. 21
A third way in which fairness defies objective characterization is
that both vertical and horizontal tests of equity presuppose some
measurement of the base upon which tax is imposed. For instance,
the income of two taxpayers is not, in fact, the same if the system
excludes economic benefits conferred on one taxpayer, but not on
the other.22 Similarly, if the system favors a certain type of expendi-
ture, a taxpayer who can make this kind of expenditure will not have
the same income as a taxpayer who cannot make such expenditures.
These ways of looking at fairness and equity illustrate what is at
stake. An important task of a tax system is to allocate the burden of
paying for government. This task is properly carried out in the con-
text of an overall social and economic policy. The decisions we
make when we choose a tax system reflect our most basic views of
how society should be organized. If we believe the tax system
should attempt to increase the benefits available to those of lesser
18. See, e.g., C. GALVIN & B. BITrKER, THE INCOME TAX: How PROGRESSIVE SHOULD
IT BE? (1966).
19. See, e.g., Blum, Revisiting the Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 60 TAXES 16 (1982).
Even strident free market advocates, one hopes, recognize some minimal burden on
society to aid the desparately impoverished.
20. For a summary of recent flat tax proposals see Graetz, The 1982 Minimum Tax
Amendments: A First Step in the Transition to a "Flat-Rate" Tax, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 527 (1983).
A pure flat rate tax is imposed at a single rate with no personal exemptions or
deductions.
21. The Treasury notes that the degree of progressivity is a matter " on which opin-
ions differ." 1 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 14. It assumed that the distribution of
the tax burden across income classes under current law should be preserved, not be-
cause the present distribution is correct, but because its preservation would render the
proposal neutral with respect to the current system. I TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at
15.
22. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 119 (employer provided meals and lodging).
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means, we will allocate a greater proportion of the tax burden to
those of greater means. On the other hand, if we believe that indi-
viduals who succeed financially are entitled to enjoy their winnings
while those who fail, or are less successful, must suffer their losses,
we will choose a system that imposes more proportionate burdens
upon all taxpayers. Thus, the debate over the tax system occurs
amidst a general debate over social policy and the proper role of
government. 23 Flat rate tax proposals are often associated with po-
sitions favoring a limited government role in the economy and fewer
social programs. General distributive notions and government mon-
itoring of the economy are conceptually consistent with a progres-
sive tax system.
Because the issues involved go to the heart of our notions of dem-
ocratic government, it is impossible to resolve fully the debate be-
tween these competing views. The equity sought in the tax
structure can be found neither in ostensibly objective measurements
of horizontal equity, nor in debates over value judgments concern-
ing progressivity. Rather, equity requires a sensitive balancing of
competing values. Those who equate the allocation of tax burdens
with the redistribution of wealth believe a fair tax system must im-
pose upon those with high incomes a proportionally greater tax bur-
den. This typically involves progressivity in the rate structure. The
progressivity must be sharp enough to persuade the middle classes
that their tax burden is significantly lighter than that of the wealthy.
Fairness also requires that wealthy taxpayers not exploit the rules to
lower their effective tax burden. This demands not only the elimi-
nation of mechanisms that permit tax avoidance, but also a reevalua-
tion of preferences and incentives to insure that only clearly defined
policy interests are served.
24
For those adopting the view that government should not interfere
with the economy, the tax system must permit some wealth to be
accumulated. To be perceived as fair, such a system must reward
those who succeed in the market economy. Further, the tax must
not be confiscatory, or even viewed as such. These ends can be
achieved either through lower rates or through a combination of
other incentives.
Both camps must share a conception of the base upon which tax is
23. See, e.g., R. NozIcK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974), but compare J. RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
24. The present system is replete with exemptions that can be characterized as subsi-
dies of preferred activity. See generally S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAx REFORM: THE CON-
CEPT OF TAx EXPENDITURES (1973).
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imposed. It is not necessary that all agree on each inclusion in, or
exclusion from, income. Neither must all agree on which expendi-
tures properly give rise to a tax benefit. Rather, it is probably suffi-
cient that the net income upon which tax is imposed be fairly
determined. The result is not necessarily a base that is comprehen-
sive, but one in which deviations from a comprehensive base can be
readily justified by policies recognized as legitimate by a national
consensus.
B. Efficiency
To be efficient, a tax system must satisfy a number of concerns.
Among these are the kinds of economic activity the tax system en-
courages or discourages, the degree to which the system impedes
business transactions, and the costs of enforcement.
Particular attention has been focused on the economic incentives
created by the tax code. 25 A common attack on the present system
is that it encourages transactions that are, at best, motivated pri-
marily by tax considerations and, at worst, excuses for fraud and
willful noncompliance. 26 The ease with which inefficient and other-
wise undesirable transactions are consummated is a major flaw in
the present system.
Largely as a reaction to tax preferences, the Treasury lists as the
first goal of tax reform "economic neutrality." 27 By use of this
term, the Treasury manifests its judgment that the tax system
should not interfere with a free market economy, which tends "to
allocate economic resources to their most productive uses." 2 8
Thus, the Treasury's "ideal tax system would be as neutral as possi-
ble toward private [economic] decisions." 29
One may share the Treasury's concern about tax preferences
without agreeing that the system should be entirely "neutral". An
alternative view is that the tax system, as part of a national economic
policy, should be used to encourage activities that the government
believes desirable. Tax policy should be used in conjunction with
other policies to pursue social and economic ends. For instance, to
encourage the development of low income housing, Congress en-
acted special tax rules benefiting both developers of, and investors
25. Id.
26. 1 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 87-91.
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in, low income housing projects. 30 The benefits available to capital
intensive industries through accelerated cost recovery deductions
and investment tax credits are further examples of how tax policy
can be integrated with economic and social policies to pursue useful
ends.3 1 In fact, no one is suggesting the elimination of perhaps the
most prominent economic incentive in the Code-the subsidy given
to homeowners and the housing industry in the form of deductions
for interest on mortgages and real estate taxes.32
The debate over whether the tax system should promote social
and economic ends reflects many of the same political issues under-
lying the fairness debate. Economic neutrality is an affirmation of
faith in the free market economy. More particularly, it is an asser-
tion that those private actors who control economic development
will make the "right" choices for society without government in-
volvement. 33 Making tax policy part of an overall social and eco-
nomic policy, however, does not imply the abandonment of a free
enterprise economy. Rather, it is a recognition that there are times
and circumstances in which the public good is served by govern-
ment moderation of unrestrained economic forces through the tax
code. 3
4
The economic efficiency of the tax system can also be measured
by its impact on business. Because taxes constitute a part of the cost
of most transactions, taxpayers will naturally structure transactions
to avoid them. This is usually accomplished by legal means. Tax
considerations, however, may cause a transaction to be structured in
an unnecessarily complex manner. The desire to avoid taxation
thus may result in additional transaction costs, as expensive profes-
sionals will be required to reduce taxable income. An efficient tax
system will minimize the distortion of sound business practices.
A third measure of a tax system's efficiency is its administrability.
This measure of efficiency is a combination of the ease with which
taxpayers can comply and the costs associated with enforcement.
For example, payroll withholding taxes are efficient because their
collection is simple and easily monitored. Taxes on imported liquor,
30. I.R.C. § 167(k) (Prentice Hall 1984).
31. The investment tax credit (I.R.C. §§ 46-48) and, to some extent, the accelerated
cost recovery provision (I.R.C. § 168) are designed to encourage businesses to invest in
new plant and equipment.
32. I.R.C. §§ 163-164.
33. Absent government intervention private economic actors would, of course, exer-
cise a dominant influence on the economy.
34. See, e.g., Graetz & McDowell, supra note 12; C. GALVIN & B. BIrrKER, supra note
18.
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however, are not efficient because their collection is difficult and not
easily monitored. A tax system's efficiency is thus inextricably re-
lated to its simplicity.
C. Simplicity
A third generally accepted premise of an ideal tax system is sim-
plicity. A tax system must be comprehensible to the public, not just
to sophisticated business excutives and professional advisers. The
concepts underlying the system should not be complex or intricate.
Compliance should be relatively easy in most situations for most
taxpayers. Taxpayers whose returns do not involve trade or busi-
ness computations should be able to avoid using tax professionals.
Further, the system should not be so complex that it affords signifi-
cant tax avoidance opportunities for those able to hire skilled
advisors.
It is important to note, however, what simplicity does not require.
The statutory provisions themselves need not be easily understood
by all taxpayers. The enormous complexity of the American econ-
omy demands complex rules to make subtle distinctions among
transactions of similar appearance but different consequences. No
modern tax system can afford not to make these difficult
distinctions.
As the foregoing analysis of fairness, efficiency and simplicity indi-
cates, a tax system requires a balancing of conflicting normative per-
spectives. A fair system must balance the views of those advocating
the primacy of economic self-interest against the views of those ad-
vocating redistribution of wealth. An efficient system must balance
the views of those who believe that the tax law must direct invest-
ment towards certain social goals against the views of those who be-
lieve the tax law must be economically neutral. A simple tax system
must balance the need to make the system comprehensible to most
taxpayers, against the need for a system complex enough to tax
transactions appropriately. How well does the Treasury's proposal
mediate these conflicts? This is the subject of Part II.
II. Analysis of the Modified Flat Tax
The Treasury's proposal is a poor substitute for even the seri-
ously flawed present system. Although the Treasury makes some
meritorious'proposals, it fails to reflect a true national consensus, or
to strike an appropriate balance between competing views of fair-
ness, efficiency and simplicity. The Report is strongly influenced by
Vol. 3:58, 1984
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free market perspectives. The Treasury's disregard for the contrary
viewpoint makes its version of the modified flat tax unfair, ineffi-
cient and not particularly simple.
The Treasury's proposal measured against the premises of an
ideal system, seems primarily intended to preserve the wealth of
those who now possess it. Although the proposal bestows some
benefit on those with incomes below the poverty line, it offers the
majority of taxpayers little relief from the present system.35 The
Treasury's proposal is unfair because it is unlikely to convince most
taxpayers that the well-off will pay their fair share. In terms of effi-
ciency, the Treasury makes progress in eliminating tax shelters, but
abdicates responsibility for determining the type of economic activ-
ity the nation ought to have. For simplicity, the Treasury offers a
system with fewer provisions, but one that introduces new complex
concepts and fails to correct many existing complexities in the
Code.
This section will make some observations regarding the level of
fairness embodied in the Treasury's proposals. Although touted as
distributionally neutral, the practical economic effects of the pro-
posed modified flat tax will disproportionately favor higher income
Americans. This is a direct consequence of the mechanisms chosen
for implementing tax reform: the reduction in tax rates, and the
broadening of the tax base through the elimination of tax prefer-
ences. This latter set of reforms will be shown to be pretextualjusti-
fications for an important readjustment of relative tax burdens
among economic classes.
The Treasury's approach to fairness is far from fair. Its principal
component is the reduction in rates. The Treasury would replace
the present system of 14 tax brackets, ranging from 11 percent to 50
percent, with three tax brackets of 15 percent, 25 percent and 35
percent.3 6 Thus, for taxpayers in the top bracket, the Treasury's
proposal would result in a 30 percent decrease in the maximum
marginal rate. 37 According to the Treasury, rate reduction will make
35. The Treasury would insure that the poor not be taxed by increasing the zero
bracket and personal exemptions. 1 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at viii. A simpler
alternative would have been to raise the zero bracket without increasing personal ex-
emptions. Under the Treasury's proposal two families with identical incomes will be
taxed differently depending on the number of children and other dependents.
36. 1 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 63. There are currently 14 brackets for mar-
ried couples and heads of households and 15 brackets for individuals.
37. Of the Treasury's examples, the largest benefit will be realized by the "typical"
married couple with annual income in excess of $600,000. 2 TREASURY REPORT, supra
note 1, Example 6.
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the system more equitable in several ways. First, it will discourage
tax shelters. 38 Rate reduction will reduce the attractiveness of both
legal and illegal tax avoidance devices. Second, lower tax rates, the
Treasury suggests, will lower barriers to entering the workforce.
Under the present system after-tax wages may not be sufficient to
compensate workers for the added costs of producing that income.
Finally, the Treasury notes that "[e]ven without elimination of the
tax preferences, credits and deductions, rate reduction will lessen
the disparity on the tax treatment of various sources and uses of
income."
39
These claims are easily disproven. On its face, the lowering of tax
rates disproportionately favor the wealthy. High income taxpayers
will reap a major windfall in the reduction of the marginal rate from
50 percent to 35 percent. The supposed benefits of the elimination
of employment disincentives are equally illusory. The Report states
that "while lower marginal rates tend to increase work incentives for
everyone, the incentive effects will be especially pronounced for sec-
ondary workers, persons who often have considerable discretions
over their labor market activity." 40 It is questionable, however,
whether the reduction in the maximum tax rate will affect radically
the incentive structure of the present system. Moreover, the extent
to which the Treasury's proposal would remedy the present system's
adverse effect on productivity can easily be exaggerated. 4' Finally,
while rate reduction necessarily reduces the economic benefit de-
rived from tax preferences, no serious tax analyst would defend the
"neutrality" of the Treasury's proposals were rate reduction not
combined with a broadened tax base. It is to these reforms that we
turn next. Ironically, these base broadening reforms actually sup-
port the charges of unfairness levelled at the Treasury's Report.
The Treasury proposes broadening the tax base in several ways.
It proposes to end the exclusion from income of virtually all forms
of employee benefits, government transfer payments and other pre-
viously tax free receipts. 42 Among the items to be included in in-
38. 1 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 4-7.
39. Id. The Treasury implies that rate reduction is contingent on the expansion of
the tax base. Id. at viii.
40. Id. at 64
41. For example, a married couple currently reaches a 42 percent marginal rate at a
taxable income of $60,000. But the couple must have more than $80,000 in taxable
income to reach the 45 percent rate, more than $100,000 of taxable income to reach the
49 percent rate and finally, more than $162,000 of taxable income to reach the maxi-
mum 50 percent marginal rate.
42. 2 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 22.
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come are group health insurance payments above a specified
amount, 43 the benefits of term life insurance, 44 and employer pro-
vided death benefits.45 In addition, unemployment benefits would
be included in income, 46 as would scholarships and fellowships to
the extent they exceed tuition charges.47 Finally, awards and prizes
would also be included in income.48
The Treasury would further broaden the tax base by eliminating
deductions and credits for many currently preferred uses of income.
The recommendation likely to have the greatest effect on revenue is
the repeal of the deduction for state and local income, sales and
property taxes. 49 Other measures include new limitations on chari-
table contribution deductions for those who itemize deductions and
the elimination of this deduction for those who do not itemize. 50
In its effort to make the tax base more comprehensive the Treas-
ury also proposes to eliminate certain particularly abused provi-
sions. Among the proposals are limitations on deductions for
business meals and elimination of deductions for ostensibly "busi-
ness related" entertainment. 5' In addition, the "at risk" rules, 52
43. Id. at 25. The Treasury's proposal would include in income the cost of employer
provided health insurance benefits to the extent they exceed $70 per month for an indi-
vidual and $175 per month for a family.
44. Id. at 29-30. The proposal would include in income the cost of all group-term
life insurance. Current law includes only the cost of such insurance in excess of $50,000.
45. Id. at 31. The Code excludes up to $5,000 of employer provided death benefits.
I.R.C. § 101(b). The Report would also include in income the cost of employer provided
group legal services, 2 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 33, and cafeteria plans which
offer employees a choice of benefits. Id. at 39.
46. Id. at 51
47. Id. at 58. Under present law, scholarships and fellowships are excluded. I.R.C.
§ 117.
48. 2 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 60. I.R.C. § 74(b) excludes prizes and
awards from income if given in recognition of religious, literary or other meritorius
achievement. The recipient must not have sought the award and cannot be required to
render substantial future services.
49. 2 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 62-65. According to the Treasury, repeal of
these deductions should yield increased revenues in excess of $33 billion. The Treasury
argues that state and local revenues are expended largely for services that satisfy the
personal needs of the individual taxpayer, such as public education, fire and police pro-
tection, mass transit, etc. A federal subsidy for personal expenditures is inconsistent
with a broad based tax.
50. Id. at 75-79. The Treasury would allow the charitable deduction when the contri-
bution exceeds 2 percent of adjusted gross income. The Treasury contends that moni-
toring small deductions is administratively difficult. Moreover, the Treasury asserts that
these deductions are an inefficient subsidy of charitable activities because taxpayers
would make these small contributions regardless of their tax consequences. Deductions
for large contributions, however, are to be maintained on the theory that they are an
efficient and necessary subsidy. In addition, a deduction for large gifts is appropriate,
the Treasury argues, because such gifts can affect substantially the ability to pay taxes.
51. Id. at 81-85. The Treasury would replace the present system, which allows de-
ductions for properly substantiated entertainment expenses if such expenses are not
Yale Law & Policy Review
which were designed to limit non-recourse financing of tax shelter
investment, would now be applied to real estate as well as to other
activities. Limitations would be imposed upon interest deductions,
other than interest incurred in a trade or business. 53 The period
over which capital assets may be depreciated would be extended.
54
Another proposal would curtail the ability of taxpayers to use family
trusts to shift income to family members in lower tax brackets.
55
These changes in the tax base are intended to negate the clear
benefits to high income individuals from reduced tax rates. Accord-
ing to the Treasury, wealthy taxpayers disproportionately benefit
from tax preferences, deductions and exclusions from income.
Therefore, the Treasury contends, the elimination of these tax
avoidance mechanisms will increase the aggregate tax liability of
extraordinary, with a detailed system that would place specific dollar limits on the
amounts that may be spent for hotels and meals. The standard would be based on the
federal per diem allowance. The Treasury seems to believe that entertainment expendi-
tures outside a strict business context are often little more than public subsidies of pri-
vate pleasures.
52. Id. at 334-335. I.R.C. § 465 limits losses to the amount the taxpayer has at risk,
"including cash and property invested, and debt only if the taxpayer is personally liable
for repayment or if the debt is secured with personal assets (up to the value of the tax-
payer's interest in the property). The taxpayer is not at risk if he is protected against
loss through nonrecourse financing, guarantees, etc." B. BiTTKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION 573 (5th ed. 1980).
53. The Treasury would extend the investment interest rules to all interest deduc-
tions other than interest paid or incurred in order to purchase or carry the taxpayer's
principal residence. The $10,000 limitation in present law (I.R.C. § 163(d)) would be
reduced to $5,000. All interest in excess of the $5,000 would be deductible against in-
vestment income, whereas under present law investment income can be used to shelter
investment interest, with interest incurred for personal purposes deductible without lim-
itation. 2 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 331-332. The Treasury would also index
indebtedness for inflation, with the result that deductions for interest would be limited
to the extent the expense represents only the true interest expense after inflation. For
example, an interest payment of $10 on a $100 loan bearing 10 percent interest would
be deductible only to the extent of $6 or six percent if the inflation rate is 4 percent. Id.
at 197-198.
54. The Treasury would replace the present accelerated cost recovery system with a
"real cost recovery system." Id. at 299. Under present law, assets are generally divided
into 3 year, 5 year, 10 year and 18 year real property with the classes describing the
period over which the cost of the asset may be recovered. I.R.C. § 168. Under the
Treasury's proposal, assets would be divided into seven classes with fixed deductions
ranging from 32 percent to three percent per year. The fixed rate would be applied
against the remaining unrecovered cost, which would be equal to the original cost, ad-
justed for inflation and decreased by previously claimed cost recovery deductions. The
net effect of this proposal would be to extend significantly the period over which the cost
of an asset may be recovered. The expansion of the "at risk" rules rests on a different
basis. This provision is intended to discourage taxpayers from using tax shelter invest-
ments to reduce their tax liabilities from their principal trade or business. 2 TREASURY
REPORT, supra note 1, at 334-335. The at risk rules are codified at I.R.C. § 465.
55. The proposal would tax unearned income of children at their parents' marginal
rate, 2 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 93, and would tax trust income at the grantor's
marginal rate, Id. at 99.
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high income taxpayers. The Treasury's logic is almost appealing.
As the Report correctly notes, taxpayers in the 50 percent bracket
disproportionately benefit from current exclusions from income,
such as those for medical insurance or group legal services. These
taxpayers also benefit disproportionately from deductions such as
those for state and local taxes. 56 The Report thus concludes that
these items are "unfair," because they are not generally available to
all taxpayers.
57
This conclusion is misleading and disingenuous. It ignores the
practical economic consequences of the repeal of these deductions
and exclusions. Taxpayers in higher tax brackets may actually re-
ceive a greater benefit, relatively speaking, once the exclusions and
deductions are repealed. The Treasury forgets the relative inability
of those with lower incomes to use after-tax income to purchase the
subjects of these exclusions and deductions. Higher bracket taxpay-
ers, on the other hand, are affluent enough to acquire these benefits
with after-tax income. In fact, as the taxpayer's income increases,
such purchases become comparatively easier, and accordingly the
lost benefit to wealthy taxpayers, while greater in terms of absolute
dollars, is far less significant to their general economic well-being.
The converse is true as taxpayer income declines. A taxpayer with
minimal income can ill-afford to use resources already committed to
necessities to purchase what might be regarded as luxuries. For in-
stance, the Treasury proposes to include in income employer paid
death benefits. These benefits are limited under current law to
$5,000 per employee. 58 That exclusion is likely to be more valuable
to low income than high income families though the latter actually
receive a greater benefit in terms of absolute dollars.
59
These proposals illustrate a distinct bias in the Report. Under
the guise of base broadening and fairness, the Treasury seeks to
eliminate those deductions and exclusions whose benefits are not
reaped predominantly by the affluent. The primary beneficiaries of
56. See generally B. BiTrKER & L. STONE, supra note 52, at 452-475.
57. 2 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 334-335.
58. I.R.C. § 101(b).
59. Another example of the Treasury proposal's unfairness is the likely effect of its
proposed changes on the charitable contribution rules. The Treasury would: preserve
charitable deductions for large gifts on the theory that such gifts significantly reduce the
ability to pay taxes. This argument, that taxes should be imposed on the basis of the
ability to pay, is rejected where the deduction for state and local taxes is concerned.
These would no longer be deductible regardless of size. The necessary inference is un-
fortunate. Large charitable deductions can generally be made only by those with in-
comes sufficient to satisfy any desired standard of living. For these individuals, the
deduction for state and local taxes is not very important.
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these tax preferences, measured by their standard of living, tend to
be low and moderate income taxpayers. It is difficult to see how
such proposals insure that the well-off will pay their fair share of
taxes.
III. Conclusion
The publication of the Treasury's tax proposals has focused the
debate over the tax system. The Treasury recommends-a major revi-
sion of the present income tax. Although denominated a "fair" tax,
the Treasury's proposal nevertheless fails to meet its obligation to
create a just and equitable tax system. The Report's central short-
coming is that it fails to reflect accurately a national consensus over
the shared premises of an ideal tax system. The Treasury purports
to have drafted an economically neutral tax system. In fact, the
Treasury has replaced one set of subsidies, preferences and political
biases with another. In short, the Treasury's Report is not the crea-
ture destined to bring economic order to the political chaos of the
Internal Revenue Code. Order can be achieved, but only by reforms
that balance more sensitively competing visions of fairness, effi-
ciency and simplicity.
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